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Human rights organisations have been active in 
documenting widespread torture in Nepal and 
Bangladesh, taking very different paths towards 
accountability—Nepal stressing civil compensation and 
Bangladesh, criminal liability. Accountability in both 
countries, however, is limited, with the poor and 
marginalised, who are particularly vulnerable to torture 
and ill-treatment, fearful of reporting incidents and 
seeking justice. This paper explores the appropriation 
and unfolding of rights vocabularies in two distinct 
political, institutional and legal contexts, and 
suggests that human rights organisations should place 
protection of victims and legal assistance alongside 
advocacy for accountability. 
R eports from human rights organisations suggest that  torture by police and armed forces is systematically  practised in Nepal and Bangladesh (Ramakrishnan 
2013).1 Over the last two decades, there has been a surge in the 
number, activities and infl uence of human rights and other 
civil society organisations in the two countries. These organi-
sations draw on the language, networks, institutions and 
norms of human rights law and often rely on international 
funding, in hostile political contexts. Both Nepal and Bangla-
desh have ratifi ed the United Nations (UN) Convention against 
Torture and  Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) and have put constitutional and legal provi-
sions in place to address torture. 
While Nepal’s Compensation Relating to Torture Act (CRTA) 
1996 has come under intense criticism from human rights 
 activists for failing to criminalise torture (Advocacy Forum 
2008),2 hundreds of cases have been brought to domestic 
courts under this act, a scale that is rare on the international 
human rights scene. Following decade-long lobbying by human 
rights activists and an order from the Supreme Court of Nepal 
on 22 May 2009, a new bill (known as the Torture or Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment [Control] Bill) that sets out 
criminal liability is pending in the Nepalese parliament. 
Bangladesh has already implemented the Torture and 
 Custodial Death (Prevention) Act, 2013 that makes torture by 
law enforcement or government offi cials a criminal offence. 
However, very few cases have been brought to the domestic 
courts under this law in Bangladesh (the exact number is 
 unknown, but according to local human rights organisations 
and independent lawyers, it is less than 10) and so far, no one 
has been convicted. 
In this paper, we compare Nepal and Bangladesh, draw 
 lessons for redress for torture victims, and examine the pros-
pects of accountability. We ask how survivors of torture have 
been able to bring cases to the courts in Nepal while similar 
cases fail to proceed to the courts in Bangladesh despite a 
 punitive law. In other words, we inspect the processes and 
practices of redress and accountability in the two countries. 
In this endeavour, we draw on two infl uential notions in 
 human rights critique and analysis, namely, Sally Engle Merry’s 
“vernacularisation” (2006), and Felstiner, Abel and Sarat’s 
“naming–blaming–claiming” (1980–1981). Both concepts have 
had a great impact on human rights thinking and practice. 
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We side with Merry (2006) when she focuses on the “social 
 processes of human rights implementation and resistance.” 
 Instead of asking whether human rights are a good idea, she 
advocates for a perspective that explores what difference they 
make. In other words, this article is not about how human 
rights ideas are adopted in culturally distinct communities or 
how ideas move from one sociocultural setting to another. It is 
about the appropriation and unfolding—the vernacularisa-
tion—of rights vocabularies in two distinct  political, institu-
tional and legal contexts (Merry 2006). It  focuses on the key 
role of human rights organisations that “translate the dis-
courses and practices from the arena of international law and 
legal institutions to specifi c situations of suffering and viola-
tion” (Merry 2006: 39). The article is about situating global 
discourses in local practices—the relationship between legal 
provisions and the infrastructure of documentation—as an 
exploration of human rights work from the perspective of 
practice under the specifi c political, institutional and legal 
contextual conditions in Nepal and Bangladesh. 
We employ Felstiner, Abel and Sarat’s notion of naming–
blaming–claiming (and/or shaming)3 to shed light on the links 
between political and legal conditions and the opportunities 
and limitations for redress and accountability in Nepal and 
Bangladesh. This approach allows us to consider the emergence 
and transformation of human rights violations and “the way in 
which experiences become grievances, grievances become dis pu-
tes, and disputes take various shapes, follow particular dispute 
processing paths, and lead to new forms of understanding.” 
“It means studying the conditions under which injuries are 
perceived or go unnoticed and how people respond to the ex-
perience of injustice and confl ict” (Felstiner et al 1980–1981: 
632). In other words, it allows us to explore how individuals 
and organisations deal with experiences of torture and ill-
treatment in particular contexts. 
In human rights work, the detection and documentation of 
violations is vital to transform injurious experiences into 
 acknowledged (legal) claims . Following the above notion, 
once an injurious experience is perceived and responsibility 
attributed, the decision on whether or not to make a claim and 
ask for remedy is made. The choice of seeking redress and 
 accountability is conditioned by the legal provisions and infra-
structure of documentation and assistance. This decision is made 
against a background of economic, political and social ine-
quality that disadvantages the poor and marginal populations 
in coming forward and claiming their rights, via courts or media. 
Drawing on fi eldwork in Nepal and Bangladesh, we show 
that human rights documentation for redress and accountability 
is not a straightforward process of situating global discourses 
in local practices, such as naming–blaming–claiming of rights. 
While there have been increased activities, networks and 
documentation by human rights organisations in the two coun-
tries, our fi ndings suggest that the poor and marginalised, 
those particularly vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment, may 
not report incidents of violence and abuse because of fear of 
repercussions and lack of resources necessary to come forward 
and seek justice. 
We argue that human rights organisations and activists 
have to consider protection to warrant the participation of survi-
vors and their families. To do this, human rights organisations 
will need to fi nd ways to identify cases of torture and ill- 
treatment that may never reach their attention—for example, 
when violent abuses take place on the street or in the homes of 
victims, not in detention or during arrest. They will also need 
to fi nd ways to ensure that redress and accountability begins with 
the safety and security of the victim claimants and their families. 
This spatial and institutional bias not only challenges acc ess to 
justice but also questions the probability of accountability. 
Legal Prohibition of Torture in Nepal
In 1990, multiparty democracy was restored in Nepal and 
 fundamental rights were guaranteed in the new constitution 
of 1991. Article 14(4) of the 1991 constitution outlawed torture 
and gave torture victims the right to compensation. Nepal’s 
most recent constitution of 2015 prohibits torture, treats it as a 
criminal offence, and recognises the right to compensation. 
In 1991, Nepal ratifi ed the UNCAT. In its attempt to meet its 
constitutional commitments, as well as its obligations under 
CAT, the Nepali government passed the CRTA 1996, the same 
year as the Maoist insurgency (1996–2005) broke out. The 
CRTA provides formal redress for victims of torture in the 
course of inquiry, investigation or hearing, or for any other 
reason. It also contains provisions for departmental action 
against government employees who infl ict torture on others. 
The defi nition of torture in the CRTA limits compensation to 
victims detained in a government facility. The victim’s relative 
or a lawyer can fi le a case in court within 35 days of the date of 
torture or release from detention. The law requires the police to 
facilitate a medical examination of detainees before detention 
and upon their release. It grants a victim of custodial torture 
the right to compensation, for a maximum of NPR1,00,000 
(approximately $1,000). 
The CRTA allows offi cials accused of torture to be defended 
in proceedings by the public prosecutor at public expense. To 
fi le a case under the CRTA, the victim needs to provide: (i) the 
 reason for detention and period in detention; (ii) details of 
 torture infl icted while in detention; (iii) details of losses 
caused by such torture; and (iv) amount of compensation 
claimed and any other details that help in proving the case. 
While determining the compensation amount, the court con-
siders the following:
(i) Physical or mental pain or hardship caused to the victim, 
and its gravity. 
(ii) Decline in income-earning capacity of the victim as a 
 result of physical or mental harm. 
(iii) Age of the victim and his or her family liabilities in case 
he or she has suffered physical or mental damage, which 
 cannot be treated. 
(iv) Estimated expense of treatment following the incident 
of torture. 
(v) Number of family members dependent on the victim’s 
 income in case of death of the victim of torture, and the minimum 
amount necessary for their livelihood. 
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(vi) Other proper and appropriate matters from among those 
contained in the claim fi led by the victim. 
Only a minority of all cases of torture and ill-treatment 
make it to court under the CRTA. Not only is there a 35-day 
limit for fi ling a case, but human rights lawyers interviewed 
said that torture survivors often do not want to carry on the 
legal battle due to the lengthy court procedures and the 
ubiquitous intimidation that goes with them. Even if the 
victim is willing to fi le a case, obtaining the paperwork (such 
as arrest papers or  detention release notes) and evidence 
(such as medical  reports, photographs or witness report) can 
be resource-intensive and daunting. Getting medical evidence, 
considered by human rights lawyers a key element of evidence 
in the court’s  decision-making, is particularly challenging. If a 
survivor is in custody and a medical report is not available, 
lawyers can make use of the legal provision in the CRTA that 
allows them to write to the court for permission to take the 
survivor for medical documentation. Often, the medical evidence 
produced by the police from government hospitals is of rela-
tively poor quality. Human rights lawyers interviewed said 
that the most common reason for losing a torture case fi led in 
court is lack of medical evidence. 
Systematic data is not available on cases under the CRTA. 
However, we can begin to put together a general picture from 
the information that does exist. In 2013–14, there were 91 
 active cases in Nepali courts under the CRTA (Supreme Court 
of Nepal 2014). In 2006, a Nepali non-governmental organisa-
tion (NGO), Centre for Victims of Torture (CVICT), published a 
compilation of court verdicts that granted compensation to 
victims (CVICT 2006). The CVICT  report states that of a total 
of 109 cases fi led by them, 21 were decided in favour of the 
survivor, eight of which ended in a “compromise” (that is, they 
were settled out of court, although there is no provision in the 
CRTA for this). A report published by the Advocacy Forum 
(2008) states that it was able to document 5,342 cases of 
torture between 1996 and 2008. Of these, 208 victims or their 
descendants have fi led cases under the CRTA, and only 52 cases 
have been decided in favour of the victims. More recently, a 
publication from the  Advocacy Forum (2014) reported that 
they fi led a total of 146 cases under the CRTA since 2003, with 
the following outcomes: 31 cases (21%) were granted compen-
sation, 48 cases (32.9%) were  dismissed, 61 cases (41.8%) were 
awaiting decision, and six cases (4.1%) were withdrawn. 
Even when compensation is ordered, survivors and human 
rights organisations report that it can take months to be 
 processed. Many survivors spend far more money, time and 
hardship during the process than is compensated. According 
to the 2006 CVICT report, the compensation claimed by  victims 
or their legal representatives ranged from NPR10,000 to 
NPR1,00,000. However, the actual compensation awarded has 
ranged only from NPR1,000 to NPR50,000, with just one 
 instance where the court awarded NPR1,00,000 (CVICT 2006). 
Similarly, the report published by the Advocacy Forum (2008) 
covering the period 1996–2008 states that of the 52 victims 
who had been awarded compensation, only seven were able to 
receive compensation in 2008.
The CRTA also gives courts the power to order departmental 
 action against individual perpetrators of torture. Importantly, 
according to the 2006 CVICT report, departmental action was 
recommended against the perpetrator in just over half the 
 successful cases. In two cases, the perpetrator was let off with 
a warning. Similarly, the Advocacy Forum report (2008) states 
that none of the perpetrators named in the CRTA cases had ac-
tually been brought to justice. Human rights workers inter-
viewed said that this has not changed in recent years and no 
one has been prosecuted for torture. 
The new bill on torture (Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment [Control] Bill, 2014) sets out criminal 
 liability. In its current form, the bill has a provision for a fi ve-
year jail term and up to NPR50,000 fi ne for a person infl icting 
torture and those encouraging it, and a three-year jail term 
and up to NPR30,000 fi ne for attempting or assisting torture. It 
seeks to increase the compensation available to victims up to 
NPR5,00,000. The bill also has a 90-day limit on fi ling a case, 
which is an increase from the 35-day limit in the current 
 legislation. However, like the CRTA, the bill in its current form 
defi nes torture as taking place in detention. There is no mech-
anism in the bill for reporting or fi ling a complaint against an 
act of torture infl icted on a person not under detention. Human 
rights organisations have criticised this bill in its current form 
for failing to meet international standards (ICJ 2016). 
Legal Prohibition of Torture in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, the use of draconian laws such as the Special 
Powers Act of 1974 (SPA) by consecutive governments and 
 paramilitary forces such as the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) 
has increased since the early 2000s. 
The SPA grants wide-ranging discretionary powers to law 
enforcement agencies (ICG 2016). The act allows for preventive 
detention initially for one month and thereafter a court may 
prolong it by six months at a time. The use of the SPA is closely 
connected to the use of Sections 54 and 197 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. Section 54 gives the police authority to 
arbitrarily arrest anyone, anywhere, at any time, without a 
court order or a warrant (see BLAST 2005). Section 197 pro-
hibits prosecution against public offi cials without the govern-
ment’s prior sanction if the offence is committed in an offi cial 
capacity. Section 197 ensures that public authorities are 
protected from accusations and criminal proceedings in the 
discharge of their offi cial duties.4 The law has been debated 
in the run-up to every election but consecutive governments 
have kept the act as a tool to motivate, control and direct law 
enforcement agencies.
The RAB has been used as the main tool to enforce govern-
ment authority. The force is recruited from all sections of the 
military and police. It is directly under the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and is therefore under the direct political supervision 
and control of the party in government. The force was esta-
blished in 2004 by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to 
combat organised crime. It was set up in the aftermath of two 
major security drives known as Clean Heart and Spiderweb in 
Khulna division on the western border with India, where military 
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units were deployed to undertake policing. It attracted popular 
support, eradicating criminal networks and groups that ordinary 
police were unable to fi ght, reclaiming state authority in the 
targeted areas. However, over time, the battalion earned a 
reputation as a death squad, known to execute people—in-
cluding opponents of the regime—in so-called “crossfi res” and 
“encounters.” Recently, incidents of crossfi re have decreased, 
and enforced disappearance has become a new reality. Little is 
known about why people disappear, but the disappeared include 
high-level opposition politicians and political opponents. 
Additional laws have given the government and law 
 enforcement agencies extensive discretion in the exercise of 
authority. The vague defi nition of “terrorist activities” under 
the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 2009 is prone to abuse and is 
 incompatible with the principle of legality, which requires that 
criminal liability and punishment be limited to clear and precise 
provisions. In addition, the Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) Act (Amendment) 2013 introduced severe 
punishment for any person publishing any material in electronic 
form that deliberately causes a deterioration of law and order, 
damage to the image of the state or person, or hurt to religious 
belief. A broadcasting policy was also introduced in 2014, 
which aims to regulate the media and freedom of speech. 
Some national media outlets have been closed down under 
this policy. Likewise, the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activi-
ties) Regulations Act 2016 could be used to curb dissent and 
the activities of NGOs defending human rights. Together, these 
legislations shrink the public space for criticism of the state 
and its practices.
Torture and Custodial Death
Before 2013, “torture” was not defi ned in Bangladesh’s 
 domestic laws. Article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh states: “No person shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or 
treatment.” If this is the case, then acts of cruel, degrading and 
inhuman treatment by law enforcement agencies can be taken 
to court as contravening constitutional guarantees. The Penal 
Code 1860 provides punishment for crimes such as “hurt” and 
“grievous hurt” to obtain information regarding the commis-
sion of a crime or the whereabouts of stolen goods, as well as 
physical assault, criminal intimidation and wrongful confi ne-
ment, all of which may also be construed as part of the act of 
“torture.” However, because there were no laws actually deal-
ing with torture as defi ned in the Convention against Torture, 
it was easy for the government to declare that torture did not 
exist in Bangladesh (Khan 2016). 
In 2013, the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) 
Act, 2013 was approved by the Bangladesh parliament.5 Its 
defi nition of “torture” is any physical or psychological 
torture that hurts. In addition, the following acts are consid-
ered torture: 
(i) Extorting any information or confession from the person 
or any other person.
(ii) Punishing any suspected person or any offender.
(iii) Intimidating any person or any other person through him.
(iv) Any work done on a discriminatory basis, act done on 
someone’s provocation, with someone’s consent or by the power 
of any government or government offi cer.6 
“Custodial death” is defi ned as “death of any person in custody 
of any government offi cial. Besides this, ‘custody’ will also 
mean illegal detention order or death during an arrest by a 
law-enforcing agent. Custodial deaths will also include death 
during interrogation, regardless of whether the person is a 
witness of the case or not.”7 
The law stipulates that torture by a law enforcement offi cer 
is punishable with imprisonment for at least fi ve years and a 
BDT25,000 fi ne, and that custodial death due to torture is pun-
ishable with life imprisonment and a BDT1,00,000 fi ne. 
The 2013 act applies to all law enforcement agencies. It  defi nes 
“law enforcement agencies” as “uniformed and disciplined forces 
like the Police, RAB, Border Guards of Bangladesh, Customs, 
Immigration, Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Special 
Branch, Intelligence  Agencies, Ansar VDP, Coast Guard and 
any other state agencies engaged in enforcement and imple-
mentation of law in the country.”8 It renders inadmissible 
various excuses for the use of torture such as  superiors’ orders, 
political interference or need for confessions.
The act provides for monetary compensation to victims—
specifi cally, BDT25,000 for the offence of torture and BDT2,00,000 
for death as a result of torture—to be paid by the convicted 
person.9 
This act states that any victim or aggrieved person can turn 
to the court if he or she suspects that the police cannot carry 
out proper investigations. In that situation, the court can ask 
for a judicial inquiry into the allegations.10 This is an impor-
tant clause because previously, victims of police abuse, for 
 instance, had to fi le a complaint at the police station stating 
they had been victimised. The offi cer-in-charge is responsible 
for forming an investigative team of police offi cers of the same 
station to investigate the complaint against a colleague. This 
confl ation of authority and interests has been counter-
productive for fi ling of cases and fair investigations. However, 
the act does not address Section 197 of the Criminal Code. 
According to the three main human rights organisations—
Odhikar, Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) and 
Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK)—involved in documentation and 
legal redress, none of the cases they have fi led has gone through 
the entire legal process. Two cases that BLAST fi led in 2014 are 
pending in the courts and no one knows when they will be heard. 
The backlog of cases in the courts has further delayed and 
complicated human rights cases. Justice is not  delivered even 
in cases of complete innocence, such as the  Limon case in which a 
young boy was shot in the leg by the RAB, later leading to am-
putation. Limon was freed of the criminal charges against him 
after 42 months of legal battle and public debate, but the cases 
against the known and named perpetrators are pending.11 
Despite its good intentions, there are fears that the 2013 law 
will be utilised by the government and politicians to control 
law enforcement agencies and ensure obedience and compli-
ance instead of achieving justice and redress for victims. The 
cases fi led and tried at the courts continue to be limited and 
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restricted to severe cases of torture, including death of the 
 victim. Several interconnected reasons could be behind this: 
(i) The law is new and there is little awareness of it and the 
rights it grants to victims.
(ii) People, especially the poor, do not trust the police or the 
courts as an instrument to achieve justice and redress. 
(iii) Victims and victims’ families are threatened with violent 
repercussions and/or implication in criminal cases if they 
complain. 
(iv) Courts and judges are threatened with violent repercus-
sions and/or political interference if they accept complaints as 
cases. 
(v) Violence, abuse and oppression are accepted as a fact by 
many poor people. Violations by authorities do not constitute 
a reason to complain. On the contrary, complainants risk 
damage to their own health and livelihood, as well as their 
family’s. Staying out of public purview is a safeguard, despite 
the physical and economic suffering and humiliation.
Human Rights Documentation in Nepal
Torture by police and armed forces has been an endemic 
 phenomenon in Nepal. While torture has been practised by the 
ruling government for long periods in the 50 years of Nepal’s 
modern history, human rights organisations report that torture 
by the police and armed forces was particularly widespread 
during the Maoist insurgency of 1996–2006, refl ecting wide-
spread impunity in the country (UN-OHCHR 2012). Throughout 
the insurgency and more specifi cally after the mobilisation of 
the army following declaration of the state of emergency in 
2001, there were widespread human rights violations in different 
parts of the country. The United Nations Offi ce of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that there 
were over 2,500 cases of alleged ill-treatment over the decade-
long insurgency (UN-OHCHR 2012). The CVICT claims that as 
many as 30,000 people were tortured during this period. 
The Terai  Human Rights Defenders (THRD) Alliance, another 
human rights NGO, writes that cases of torture have been 
widespread in Nepal’s southern Terai region since the Madhesh 
uprising12 of 2007 (THRD Alliance 2014). Following the insurgency, 
human rights organisations report that the police have continued 
to infl ict torture and ill-treatment, particularly as a method of 
securing a “confession.”
In Nepal, the history of human rights work is closely linked 
to the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990, and the 
protracted political transition following the Maoist insurgency. 
Against the background of the expansion of the public sphere 
and the use of the language of rights, international funding for 
human rights organisations began to come into Nepal through 
bilateral donors, UN agencies, international organisations and 
private foundations. This led to the development of an infra-
structure of documentation, with its organisational structures 
and professional incentives. 
Since 1993, the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) has 
been publishing the Human Rights Year Book based on its 
 annual monitoring of human rights. The CVICT was the fi rst 
organisation, established in 1990, to work explicitly on torture. 
Much of its earlier work focused on state violence during the 
pro-democracy protests of 1990 and later expanded to include 
torture amongst Bhutanese refugees as well as Maoist insur-
gency in Nepal. The Advocacy Forum was established in 2001, 
largely as a response to Nepal’s confl ict-related torture, illegal 
detention, enforced disappearance, and extrajudicial killings. 
Established in 2002, the Forum for Protection of People’s 
Rights, Nepal (PPR-Nepal) has been engaged in documentation 
of torture and ill-treatment and other human rights violations 
following the escalation of Maoist insurgency and the state’s 
response to it in early 2000. The THRD Alliance was estab-
lished  informally in 2008, and registered in 2011, as a direct 
response to the political movement in Nepal’s lowland Terai 
region,  bordering India. The THRD Alliance is engaged in pub-
lic advocacy as well as fi ling cases in Nepali courts. 
A mapping of human rights organisations in 2014 showed 
that there are 17 organisations involved in the documentation 
of human rights, including torture and ill-treatment. Four of 
them focus explicitly on the documentation of torture and 
 ill-treatment. This is in addition to regular media reports and a 
number of international organisations, such as the Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Asian Human Rights 
Commission, among others, which occasionally bring out 
reports on human rights violations, torture and ill-treatment 
specifi cally. This number does not include organisations that 
broadly consider human rights their mandate but do not docu-
ment cases, although they may refer cases of human rights vio-
lation to organisations that do document torture and ill-treat-
ment. Only two human rights NGOs (Advocacy Forum and 
THRD Alliance) involved in torture documentation had staff at 
branch offi ces outside of Kathmandu. INSEC has district repre-
sentatives in all of the 75 districts of Nepal, who are paid a 
small stipend and an incentive or reward for each case of 
 human rights violations they identify and report. 
The social networks of these organisations and their staff or 
representatives in NGOs, media, government offi ces, police, 
lawyers, and health facilities, are integral to the monitoring, 
identifi cation and documentation of torture and ill-treatment. 
Human rights organisations have the greatest organisational 
presence in urban areas and the Kathmandu Valley. 
Human Rights Documentation in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, torture, custodial death, extrajudicial killings 
known as “crossfi res” and enforced disappearances are wide-
spread (ASK 2015; HRW 2016a; ICG 2016; Odhikar 2014). For 
decades, the party in government has ruled with a fi rm hand, 
utilising the law, law-making and law enforcement agencies to 
suppress opponents (Islam 2013). All governments have 
 blatantly used the parliament to benefi t themselves and their 
 allies. The two parties have continuously utilised, amended and 
ignored the legal system for their own ends, which has created 
a society based on the rule through law, not rule of law. Members 
of parliament use state resources such as contracts, jobs and 
promotions, to build support bases and secure vote banks. 
This practice ensures party control of the state and esta-
blishes a structure for the exchange of favours, distribution of 
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benefi ts, allocation of rewards, and nomination of positions 
 (Andersen 2016). 
Today, violence, torture and ill-treatment are the product of 
three processes. The fi rst is harassment, extortion and inter-
rogation by police offi cers.13 The second is ongoing political 
tension between supporters of the Awami League government 
and its opponents, mainly in the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. The 
third is the rise of political terrorism in the country by people 
aligned to fundamentalist and extremist readings of Islam. 
 Increasing securitisation of society, in an attempt to pre-empt 
further attacks, challenges the basic rights and liberties 
 stipulated in the constitution and in international law.
This follows a trend of increasing extrajudicial killings and 
enforced disappearances that commenced with the re-election 
of the Awami League government for a second consecutive 
term for the fi rst time in Bangladesh’s political history (HRW 
2016b). This came after the cancellation of the caretaker 
 system, the change of election laws that prevented Jamaat-e-
Islami from participating, and the boycott of the major opposi-
tion party, the BNP, which resulted in an election where 154 out 
of 300 seats were won uncontested. 
Hundreds of organisations work on human rights issues. 
Many are registered and some are not. The majority are either 
not active or work as a façade for political actors on either side 
of the political spectrum. Most of the human rights organisa-
tions were established around the time democracy was 
 reinstated in 1991, after 16 years of successive military regimes. 
Three organisations have a reputation for actively docu-
menting and publishing on human rights issues, torture and 
ill-treatment in particular. (As in Nepal, this is in addition to 
regular media reports and a number of international organisa-
tions such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International 
and the Asian Human Rights Commission, among others, that 
occasionally bring out reports on human rights violations 
more generally and torture and ill-treatment specifi cally. This 
does not include other organisations that broadly consider 
 human rights their mandate but do not document cases although 
they may refer cases of human rights violation to organisations 
that do.) At the time of research, these three organisations 
were ASK, Odhikar and BLAST. ASK was founded in 1986. It 
provides legal aid, undertakes documentation of human rights 
violations, and advocates for the rights of victims and the poor. 
ASK operates in just under a third of Bangladesh’s 64 districts. 
BLAST, founded in 1993, is a legal services organisation, spe-
cialising in women’s and constitutional issues, operating in 
under a third of the country’s districts.14  Odhikar, founded in 
1994, specialises in the documentation of torture and extra-
judicial killings and has a network of supporters in two-thirds 
of Bangladesh’s districts. Since 10 August 2013, Odhikar has 
come under increasing political and economic pressure from 
the Bangladesh government.15
Both ASK and Odhikar monitor human rights violations in 
the country. According to ASK, 195 people were killed by law 
enforcement agencies between January and December 2016.16 
According to Odhikar, between January and June 2016, 74 
persons were allegedly killed and six were tortured to death 
by law enforcement agencies. Forty-eight persons had disap-
peared after being picked up, allegedly by men claiming to be 
members of law enforcement agencies. Of them, six were found 
dead and 22 were later produced before the court or had sur-
faced alive. The whereabouts of 20 persons are still unknown, 
and 34 have died in custody (Odhikar 2016).
With the exception of BLAST, the organisations do not have 
branch offi ces, and rely on referrals by third parties and volun-
teer members of local human rights networks. Human rights 
workers are usually either lawyers or journalists. Clinicians 
for medico-legal reports are recruited on consultancy or volun-
tary basis. However, it is often diffi cult to persuade doctors to 
take up such work. 
The modalities of work, including national and local coverage 
and documentation, are constrained by the fact that less than 
30 people work professionally with the documentation of 
 human rights violations, torture and ill-treatment, including 
the inactive Human Rights Commission. This, in a country of 
more than 150 million citizens, with 12 million in Dhaka alone. 
Resources, be they fi nancial, logistical or human, do not match 
the depth and extent of the problem. 
As in Nepal, the social networks of organisations and their 
staff, whether they are NGOs, media, government offi cers, 
 police, lawyers or health workers, are key to the identifi cation 
and documentation of torture and ill-treatment. Human rights 
organisations have the greatest presence in urban areas and 
especially in the capital, Dhaka.
Common Challenges
Almost all human rights organisations that work on torture in 
Nepal and Bangladesh draw on the language, institutions and 
norms of international human rights law, and have focused on 
legal accountability. 
They are run by legal professionals with limited medical or 
psychosocial expertise, and their work is mostly shaped by an 
orientation towards advocacy of institutional and legal reform, 
or “naming and shaming.” Issuing urgent appeals, taking cases 
to the UN Human Rights Committee, litigation and public 
advo cacy are strategies employed by human rights organisa-
tions that often prioritise legal accountability above protection 
of survivors. This strategy has important consequences, as sur-
vivors of torture may want to prioritise silence over reporting. 
Thus, while “naming and shaming” remains a preferred strategy 
of human rights organisations, it may discourage survivors 
from coming forward to report their experiences for fear of 
repercussions. 
All human rights organisations in Nepal and Bangladesh 
publish reports. Though these reports may be targeted at the 
urban intellectual class at the national level and the global 
community of informed human rights actors, changes in 
 specifi c country contexts are pursued through law and insti-
tutional reform efforts. However, when the prospects of 
change on the ground are not positive or conducive to public 
campaigning and advocacy, international dissemination 
becomes a viable tool. This is based on the hope that external 
attention and action will bring about change in the actions 
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of law  enforcement agencies, limiting violations and ensur-
ing  acco untability.
Given the lack of resources within politically hostile national 
environments, human rights organisations rely on international 
funding and transnational networks, often on a project basis, 
to carry on their documentation and fact-fi nding activities. 
When projects end, organisations often follow up only those 
cases that are not too costly to pursue in logistical, fi nancial 
and human resource terms, or cases with prospects for political 
agenda–setting, nationally and internationally. 
This positions human rights organisations in the precarious 
space between the people and the government. Critics point 
out that the dependence on international funding makes 
 organisations more accountable to donors than to survivors. 
This is substantiated by the fact that reports are mainly  written 
and published in English. More recently, human rights organi-
sations working in Nepal have been criticised by victim groups 
and other commentators for elitist and donor-serving human 
rights work in Nepal. 
Making themselves accountable to the local population, 
 especially the poor and marginalised, is a serious challenge for 
the human rights community, even beyond Nepal and Bangla-
desh. Human rights organisations do not just need to improve 
detection and documentation but to ensure adequate and 
 relevant assistance, including protection of those whose rights 
have been violated.
Conclusions
Nepal and Bangladesh illustrate the limitations and potentials 
of focusing human rights work on criminalisation and fi nancial 
redress for acts of torture. 
Despite the limitations of Nepal’s CRTA, scores of survivors 
have been granted compensation since the act came into force. 
This in itself can be seen as a considerable success, though 
 survivors face hurdles in receiving compensation, and many of 
those awarded compensation by the court do not receive it. In 
contrast, in Bangladesh, hardly a handful of cases have made 
it to the courts under the Torture and Custodial Death 
 (Prevention) Act, 2013. 
Nepal has a relatively well-developed infrastructure of 
 documentation, partly as a legacy of the expansion of the civic 
sphere post 1990. This network of organisations and activists 
is crucial for the relative success of the CRTA. Indeed, the exist-
ence of the CRTA has also shaped much documentation work 
done by human rights organisations. It also means, however, 
that documentation is simultaneously enabled and limited by 
the existing infrastructure, legal provisions and priorities of 
human rights organisations. 
Nepal’s CRTA results in unequal access to the courts and 
fails to prioritise wider political accountability. Nepal’s case 
shows that political and legal action against perpetrators of 
torture could make compensation for individual survivors 
more diffi cult. More broadly, the criminalisation of torture 
can have an important role in prevention, as well as in ending 
impunity. However, the criminalisation of torture could in 
fact shrink the space available for individual compensation. 
Human rights organisations have to open up avenues for justice, 
redress and compensation.
The Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act, in Bang-
ladesh criminalises torture and requires that a police  offi cer 
be suspended whilst an investigation is carried out. In the 
absence of working victim protection mechanisms though, 
the result is not higher levels of criminal accountability but 
higher levels of intimidation, as police offi cers pressurise 
 survivors to withdraw cases. The Bangladesh case shows that 
though the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act is a 
very progressive legislation, the scope for practical applicability 
is very limited. 
There are two reasons why the act has had a limited effect 
so far. The fi rst relates to the legal framework that plays a 
 decisive role in the potential success of the act. Draconian laws 
that grant complete immunity for the actions of law enforcement 
agents have been in place for decades. The SPA and special acts 
in connection with large-scale security drives have under-
mined the possibilities of applying the Torture and Custodial 
Death (Prevention) Act in general and also weakened  access to 
justice and the rule of law. Accountability is not a practical 
 reality and naming is hardly a realistic option,  especially for 
the poor, marginalised and resourceless. 
The second reason relates to the political system and the 
practice of politics and politicking. The historically antagonistic 
relationship and competition between the Awami League and 
BNP over control of state institutions and state  resources 
through elections inherently obstructs the implementation of 
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progressive laws that grant opportunities for justice to all 
 citizens. For instance, the SPA has been debated in the run-up 
to most elections, but has not been cancelled by either party 
when in power. Furthermore, as in many other countries 
 today, human rights as well as the wider civil and political 
rights such as freedom of expression and assembly, are under 
pressure. When law enforcers have greater discretion and 
wider legal boundaries for investigation and control, critical 
voices within media and civil society are threatened, and ac-
cess to justice and legal redress, including the naming of inju-
ries, is hampered. These are the challenges today.  Political 
conditions within both countries do not indicate  positive pro-
poor changes in current practices of justice and redress, or 
progressive changes in the legal framework. Given the prac-
tices of documentation today, it is very likely that the suffer-
ing of the poor and marginalised may not be perceived and 
named. Not only are the poor extremely vulnerable to 
 violence due to their  precarious situation, but they lack the 
resources and support that are necessary to report cases and 
seek justice. 
Therefore, to identify violent exposure and name injurious 
experiences, to make claims of accountability, human rights 
work has to go beyond documentation for legal accountability 
and political advocacy. It needs to consider the protection of 
victims as a priority. 
Human rights organisations should continue to test the legal 
frameworks for justice, redress and compensation under  national 
and international law and legal obligations. However, they 
should engage further with organisations of the poor and mar-
ginalised that could help identify cases of torture and 
 ill-treatment that may never come to their attention. Such an 
engagement would also offer the possibility of relevant assis-
tance and protection of victims while cases are documented, 
injuries named and advocacy advanced. 
notes
 1 Also see https://www.hrw.org/news/2014 / 06/ 
 26/hrw-torture-expanding-scourge-asia. 
 2 Also see http://www.omct.org/reports-and-pub -
lications/nepal/2015/11/d23450/; http://alrc.a s -
ia/nepal-torture-and-ill-treatment-in-nepal-a-
n ti-torture-law-impunity-and-the-upr/; ht t ps: / 
 /www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/04/nepal-war-
n ing-rights-abusers.
 3 The preferred strategy of many international 
human rights organisations is to embarrass 
 regimes into changing laws, policies and practices. 
 4 Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
states: “(1) When any person who is a Judge 
within the meaning of Section 19 of the Penal 
Code, or when any Magistrate, or when any 
public servant who is not removable from his 
offi ce save by or with the sanction of the Gov-
ernment is accused of any offence alleged to 
have been committed by him while acting or 
purporting to act, in the discharge of his offi -
cial duty, no Court shall take cognisance of 
such offence except with the previous sanction 
of the Government; (2) The Government may 
determine the person by whom, the manner in 
which, the offence or offences for which, the 
prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public 
servant is to be conducted, and may specify the 
Court before which the trial is to be held.”
 5 It was tabled in parliament as a private mem-
ber’s bill by Member of Parliament Saber Hos-
sain Chowdhury in 2009 and passed by the 
parliament as the Torture and Custodial Death 
(Prevention) Act in 2013. 
 6 Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act, 
2013, Section 2(vii). Unoffi cial translation  in 
BLAST 2015.
 7 Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act, 
2013, Section 2 (vii).
 8 Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act, 
2013, Section 3 (iv). 
 9 Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act, 
2013, Section 15.
10  Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act, 
2013, Section 5.
11   Limon Hossain became a well-known public 
fi gure when media and human rights organisa-
tions picked up his case. Limon was mistakenly 
shot by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) on 
suspicion of being a criminal. Though RAB 
quickly realised he was not a criminal but a 
school student (he was 16 at the time of the in-
cident) they nonetheless implicated him in two 
cases of possession of arms, obstructing on-duty 
law enforcers, attempted murder and injuring 
RAB personnel.
12  The Madhesh uprising was an ethno-regional 
movement in Nepal’s Terai region bordering 
India that challenged the Nepali state. Not only 
has this ongoing movement put federalism on 
the political agenda in Nepal, it has also result-
ed in signifi cant loss of life, injuries, damage of 
property and disruption of communal harmony. 
The uprising has historical roots in the parti-
cular process of state formation and nation-
alism in Nepal.
13  See BLAST and Others v Bangladesh and Others, 
http://www.blast.org.bd/issues/ju stice/ 2 1 4-
3806of1998. 
14  See  http://www.blast.org.bd/who.
15   Written statement submitted by Odhikar to the 
Coalition for Human Rights, 27th session, agen-
da item 4: “Human Rights Situations That Re-
quire the Council’s Attention,” 25 August 2014.
16  See http://www.askbd.org/ask/2017/01/08/d -
e ath-law-enforcing-agencies-january-dece m b-
er-2016/.
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